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FROM NATIONAL POPULISM TO NATIONAL CORPORATISM: 
THE CASE OF BOLIVIA (1952-1970) 
MEL VIN BURKE 
University of Maine 
JAMES M. MALLOY 
University of Pittsburgh 
I n the wake of the depression of 1929 there sprung up throughout Latin America a number of reformist political 
movements which today are generally lumped under the term 
National Populist Movements (Di Tella, 1965). Among the best 
known of these movements were Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (APRA) in Peru, Accion Democratica (AD) in 
Venezuela, and Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in 
Bolivia. These movements projected themselves as sui generis Latin 
phenomena which would ~olve the problems of economic 
development and social justice in Latin America in a unique 
"national" way-neither socialist nor capitalist. While the pro-
grams of these movements varied somewhat (often reflecting their 
different histories), there was and remains a central core of 
national popUlist ideology and orientation. 
Stripped to its essentials, the national populist ideology 
projected two major goals: (1) to break the traditional dependence 
of the local economy on the industrial centers of the United States 
and Europe, e.g., antiimperialism; and (2) to destroy local 
semifeudal structures, such as the latifundia, so as to liberate 
human and material resources for state-sponsored development. 
These two goals were embedded in a diagnosis which argued that 
national problems were not the result of class exploitation but 
rather the exploitation of the nation (middle classes, workers and 
peasants) by the antination (the local oligarchy and the imperial 
foreign interests it served). To resolve this problem, they argued, a 
broad multiclass movement-as opposed to a class-based party-
had to be formed to seize power from the local oligarchy, break its 
hold on the economy, and assert national economic as well as 
political independence of the imperialist powers. 
Although oriented toward the mobilization of workers and 
peasants, these movements were mainly supported and led by 
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elements of the dependent urban middle sectors (e.g., those who 
lived off salaries and fees). The middle-class intellectual elites who 
organized these movements saw themselves as paladins called upon 
to lead their backward countries, and the culturally under-
developed workers and peasants that inhabited them, to the 
fulfillment of their respective national destinies. l They would do 
so by seizing the state and utilizing it to regulate the society and 
economy so as to achieve economic development and social 
justice. Despite the fears these movements generated among 
established interests, their programs were hardly revolutionary, 
calling rather for substantial, but hardly total, reform imposed 
from above. The political history of all these movements clearly 
shows that the core orientation of the so-called populist elites was 
reformist, elitist and statist. 
In this paper we seek to analyze the experience of one Latin 
American nation, Bolivia, which has been undergoing an experi-
ment in a "populist" resolution of her socioeconomic problems 
since 1952. We shall focus primarily on the decade of the 1960s, 
when after eight years of tortuous veering along a number of 
policy paths, a clear model of development began to emerge. 
The model of development which emerged in Bolivia during the 
1960s can best be termed national corporatism: a system of 
political economy that attempts to achieve controlled economic 
growth by fusing traditional hispanic concepts of state control 
with modern corporate organizations in both the public and 
private sectors. National corporatism is an authoritarian and statist 
approach to development that results in an elitist and hierarchical 
mode of social organization, which from the point of view of most 
in the lower social orders is often repressive and at best 
paternalistic. Ironically, the so-called populist approach, due to a 
number of factors delineated below, evolves into a system of 
political economy which is decidedly antipopular. The Bolivian 
case is not unique but a manifestation of a general trend toward 
authoritarian solutions to development evident in a number of 
Latin American states. An analysis of the Bolivian case can shed 
light on the general trend and contribute specific insights into 
what to expect from other so-called popUlist regimes such as the 
populist military government of neighboring Peru. 
Bolivia: 1952-1964 
In 1964 the MNR, which initiated the Bolivian National 
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Revolution of 1952, was overthrown in a military coup backed by 
large segments of the populace including workers and peasants. 
The coup did not represent a counterrevolution so much as a 
ratification by arms of the failure of the MNR to achieve the 
revolutionary goals it had set for Bolivia. 
The failure of the MNR to achieve its revolutionary goals can be 
traced to a number of factors endemic to the contemporary 
developmental situation and to the nature of populist coalitions 
themselves. The first is a contradiction between the strategic 
political goal of mobilizing the middle class, workers and peasants 
by playing upon the pent-up demands of these groups for 
increased standards of living, and the strategic economic goal of 
rapid development. In the underdeveloped situation the economic 
goal demands internal economies by restricting consumption, but 
the political goal of the populists demands the mobilization of 
support by meeting the consumptionist desires of the popular 
masses. 
Between 1952 and 1956 the MNR elite tried to meet both goals 
at once and followed a dual policy of investment and consump-
tion. During this period the Left, backed by workers' militias, was 
dominant and Bolivia was headed in a populist and essentially 
socialist direction. However, the dual policy sent the state mining 
corporation (COMIBOL) into a tailspin, created severe balance of 
payments problems, and set off wild inflation that fell most 
heavily on the urban middle class, thereby turning that group 
against the revolution. 
These problems brought home three inescapable facts: (a) an 
underdeveloped country cannot follow a course of economic 
development and popular consumption at the same time; (b) any 
process of restructuring for development demands that some social 
groupings must pay the social costs of the new course; and (c) the 
populist premise of a community of interests among the middle 
class, workers and peasants flies in the face of the reality of the 
underdeveloped situation. There is of necessity a conflict of 
interests among such diverse groupings: fitst over the distribution 
of rewards but latterly over the even more divisive issue of the 
distribution of the social costs of any developmental strategy. 
Facing the scarcity of the underdeveloped situation, the populist 
movement that comes to power immediately confronts a dual 
problem: (1) the contradiction between economic and political 
goals; and (2) the conflict of interests among its support groups. 
52 COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Any consistent model of development requires that the govern-
ment be in a position to restrict consumption in the name of 
development and that it choose which of its own support groups 
gain and which lose. 
In confronting these difficult problems, the MNR found itself 
with an additional problem, namely the need to secure external 
financial support to supplement Bolivia's meager resources. In 
Bolivia the decision was made to reject the socialist bloc as a 
source of aid (at that stage there is serious question as to whether 
the Soviet Union wanted or could afford to accept the burden) 
and rely almost exclusively on the capitalist states. On one hand, 
the decision reflected the need to bow to the realities of the 
dependent nature of an underdeveloped economy; on the other, it 
reflected the long-standing determination of not only the MNR 
elite but other popUlist elites as well to stay firmly within the 
western camp. The Bolivian case supports the view that populist 
antiimperialism boils down to less a question of breaking the ties 
that bind Latin America to the United States and Europe, than to 
rearranging them in a way that hopefully benefits the local 
dependent country (Cotler, 1970-71). In any event, once the 
decision was made the previous questions of benefit and loss were 
already decided. 
This became clear in 1956 when in order to secure International 
Monetary Fund (lMF) financing, the MNR accepted a monetary 
stabilization program which reversed the previous thrust of the 
revolution (Eder, 1968: 626). It did so by stopping the expansion 
of the public sector, reintroducing market principles, and shifting 
costs onto labor by freezing wages and withdrawing food 
subsidies. When labor responded negatively, the MNR set out to 
break its political power by rebuilding the military as a 
counterweight to workers' militias and by turning the major 
peasant organizations against the communist-inspired labor move-
ment. During this period the Bolivian National Revolution was 
going through a major change of gears brought on by internal and 
external constraints. The major factors were: (a) the basic 
reformist orientation of the old-guard MNR elite; (b) the 
contradiction between economic and political logics in an 
environment of extreme scarcity and high mobilization; (c) the 
internal contradictions of the multi class populist movement itself; 
(d) the price tag affixed to much needed external financing. By 
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1960 the populist phase of the revolution was over and the 
groundwork was laid for the national corporate phase which was 
to follow. 
This new mode of political economy was broadened and more 
clearly defined after 1960 within the context of the Alliance for 
Progress strategy accepted by the MNR. Particularly under the 
Triangular Plan2 for the rehabilitation of the tin industry, labor 
was kept on the defensive and the MNR instituted a concerted 
effort to break its political power once and for all. Through the 
"civic action" logic central to the Alliance, President Paz 
Estenssoro sought to solidify the military-peasant alliance and 
with U.S. help turned the military into the key group in the 
situation.3 During this period the organized private sector of the 
economy made a startling comeback, the position of COMIBOL 
stabilized and Bolivia began to register growth rates of over 5 
percent per year. Despite these apparent economic successes, 
internal divisions in the MNR and social protest brought on by 
President Paz's policies so weakened the credibility of the MNR 
that it was a surprisingly simple task for the military to topple the 
government in November 1964.4 
The Generals and the Revolution: 
The Consolidation of National Corporatism 
From November 1964 to August 1966, Bolivia was governed by a 
military cabinet with first General Rene Barrientos alone, and later 
(in May) he and General Alfredo Ovando together acting as chief 
executive. In 1966 Barrientos waged a successful electoral 
campaign and in August was inaugurated as constitutional 
president. Ovando assumed the position of commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces. Throughout this period both stressed that their 
administration did not constitute a counterrevolution but a true 
realization of the national populist revolution originally promised 
by th~ MNR but betrayed by capricious men such as Paz. 
The new government immediately looked to the United States 
as a major source of aid and, after a brief period of indecision, the 
United States supported the generals. Indeed many in the 
American Embassy argued that only the military had the will and 
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capacity to maintain stability, promote enterprise and achieve 
planned rates of economic growth. 
The coup of 1964. changed little from the point of view of 
political economy. The new regime followed, bUt more effectively, 
the same game plall formulated by Paz and his U.S. advisers in the 
previous four years (Thorn, 1971: 199). Under Barrientos and 
Ovando, Bolivia moved definitively and rather ruthlessly in the 
national corporatist direction. Under the new law for the 
promotion of investment passed in October 1965, private 
investment rose from $3 million in 1963-64 to $47 million in 
1966. Gulf Oil investments increased from an annual average of 
$6,991,706 (1957-63) to an average of $16,742,475 (1965-68). 
New mining laws also spurred private investment and parts of the 
state's mining activities were denationalized. 5 The Matilde zinc 
mine, for example, was sold to a U.S. combine of U.S. Steel and 
the Philips brothers. In addition, private contract mining was 
reintroduced into the state mining operation and many laid-off 
miners were obliged to work for these contractors without the 
labor code's protection. The resurgence of the private sector in 
mining and petroleum is evident in Table 1. 
Table 1 Private and Public Production of 
Crude Oil and Minerals (1963-1968) 
CRUDE OIL 
(000 cubic meters) 
MINERALS* 
(000 metric tons) 
Private Public Private Public 
(Gulf) (Y.P.F.B.) 
1963 18.5 501.6 27.0 
1964 15.2 498.0 35.0 
1965 2.3 528.2 35.0 
1966 458.6 504.5 43.0 
1967 1,872.0 435.1 47.0 
1968 1,886.2 497.4 48.3t 
*Minerals include tin, lead, zinc, copper, antimony and wolfram. 
t USAID estimates. 
Source: USAID (1969a). 
(COMIBOL) 
26.0 
28.0 
27.0 
33.0 
32.0 
34.5t 
Private corporate activity once again dominated mining which 
accounted for 85 percent of Bolivia's export earnings and 
petroleum, the nation's fastest growing industry. While there is no 
precise serial data on rates of private tnvestment in other 
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industries, Table 2 shows that by 1968 the overall Bolivian 
economy was dominated by the private sector. Private corporate 
activity had truly made a comeback in the 1960s. 
Table 2 Gross Domestic Product and Employment 
Broken Down by Private and Public Sector Contributions (1968) 
Gross Domestic Prod.* Employmentt 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Total Public Private Total Public Private 
Agriculture 1,224 05 95 897 05 95 
Mining 457 55 45 54 45 55 
Petroleum 435 20 20 07 65 35 
Manufacturing & energy 773 25 75 104 25 75 
Construction 346 30 70 122 30 70 
Commerce & finance 619 05 95 98 05 95 
Transportation 417 05 95 58 05 95 
Government 475 100 00 58 100 00 
Other services 500 20 80 167 20 80 
Total 5,245 25 75 1,567 15 85 
*In millions of pesos at 1958 prices. 
tIn thousands. 
Source: Burke (1970). 
Bolivia's public corporations were not neglected by the 
Barrientos government. During the years 1965-68, EN DE (the 
national electic power company), LAB (the national airlines) and 
other Bolivian public corporations received substantial assistance 
from both the Bolivian government and foreign lenders. LAB 
alone began receiving the first dispersion of an $18 million loan 
package in 1968 negotiated by the Barrientos government. The 
nationalized railroads obtained credits from Japan totaling $10 
million in 1966 for capital equipment. In addition, the third phase 
of the Triangular Plan to rehabilitate COMIBOL was agreed upon 
in the summer of 1965 after the Bolivian government sent the 
army to the mines to "discipline" (destroy) the labor unions and 
to "rationalize" (reduce) the labor force. Under this agreement, 
COMIBOL received credits totaling $10 million to be expended by 
1968. As a result of this economic policy, the major public 
corporations of Bolivia in the aggregate began to realize economic 
profits for the first time in their history. 
When the proposed tin smelter, gas pipeline, fertilizer plant and 
other public investments are added to the above, the evidence 
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supporting the contention that the Barrientos government pursued 
an economic policy of promoting large-scale private and public 
corporate units is substantial. The gas pipeline alone necessitated 
. an investment of $46 million jointly financed by Gulf Oil 
Company and the World Bank. The private and public corpora-
tions of Bolivia are similar in more ways than they differ. Both are 
autonomous, profit-maximizing and growth-oriented enterprises. 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1964-68 
*Loss (-); profit (+) 
tUSAID estimates. 
Table 3 Profit and Loss* Positions 
of the Major Public Enterprises 
($ millions) 
COMIBOL Y.P.F.B. Railroads 
-4.1 1.1 -3.1 
0.3 1.4 -1.3 
2.0 2.6 -1.3 
1.1 3.6 -0.7 
1.2 4.0 -1.3t 
0.5 12.7 -7.8 
Source: USAID (1969a). 
Total 
-6.2 
0.4 
3.3 
4.0 
3.9 
5.4 
If Bolivia were not an underdeveloped country, none of this 
behavior on the part of the Barrientos government would seem 
worthy of mention, let alone analysis. However, Bolivia is an 
underdeveloped country with a large traditional sector which this 
national corporate policy discriminates against. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in agriculture. 
Traditionalism 
In Table 2 agriculture is seen to engage more people in production 
than any other sector, yet agriculture was the only major Bolivian 
industry that experienced virtually no growth during 1964-68 as 
seen in Table 4. In addition, it is estimated that the majority of 
the Bolivian labor force engaged in agricultural production 
accounted for only 20 percent of the gross domestic output in 
1968. 
How does one explain this lack of growth in the agricultural 
sector when the avowed goal of the Bolivian development plan is 
to diversify the economy, to substitute domestic food production 
. for imports and to raise the standard of living (Ministerio de 
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Planificaci6n, 1962)? Agriculture, unlike mining, aviation and the 
other sectors, is dominated by nonmodern units of production 
best described as traditional peasant farms. Largely because of 
this, agricultural production was assigned a low priority by the 
Barrientos government. In addition, it was the modern corporate 
segment of agriculture which received the bulk of the technical 
assistance and financial support allocated. 
Table 4 Index of Gross Domestic Product Increases 
by Sector in Constant 1958 Prices (1963 = 100) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Agriculture 100 1.02 1.05 1.06 0:99 1.03 
Mining 100 1.08 1.09 l.l8 1.24 1.27 
Petroleum 100 1.06 2.12 1.56 2.69 2.84 
Manufacturing & energy 100 1.09 1.20 1.32 1.40 1.49 
Construction 100 1.02 1.28 1.42 1.75 2.01 
Commerce & finance 100 1.04 1.08 l.l1 l.l4 1.20 
Transportation 100 1.05 1.09 l.l3 l.l9 1.24 
Government services 100 l.l4 l.l5 1.26 1.28 1.32 
Other services 100 l.l2 l.l4 l.l8 1.11 1.29 
Total 100 1.05 l.l1 l.l8 1.24 1.31 
Source: Ministerio de Planificaci6n (1969). 
Because the latifundia of prerevolutionary Bolivia were ineffi-
cient, backward and stagnant, they were expropriated in 1953 and 
the land redistributed to the peasants.6 The governments of 
Bolivia have since been faced with a dilemma inasmuch as the new 
land tenure system is also predominantly nonmodern in structure. 
This may explain why the Bolivian governments have not yet 
legally entitled all the land obtained by the peasants under the 
agrarian reform law. Only about 25 percent of the agricultural 
land censused in 1950 was redistributed to the peasants by 1968. 
In addition, the Barrientos government during 1964-68 granted an 
annual average of 16,119 titles as compared with an annual 
average of 40,095 titles issued during the previous five years 
(Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Departamento de Estadi-
sticas). One explanation for the small amount of land titled since 
1953 is the fact that the large estates in the lowlands were not 
affected by the reform. These lowland estates now constitute the 
new corporate sector of Bolivian agriculture. 
As can be seen in Table 5 below, Bolivia spends the same 
amount of foreign exchange on food and related agricultural 
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imports today as it did before the agrarian reform of 1953. In 
1967, $22.4 million of milk, wheat flour and edible oil were 
imported, all of which could have been produced in Bolivia. 
Table 5 Value of Imports by Type 
($ millions) 
Food, Beverages, Mfg. Other 
Tobacco & Live Raw Capital Mfg. 
Year Animals Materials Goods Goods 
1952 27.8 10.8 15.5 38.5 
1954 23.1 9.8 1l.8 20.8 
1956 2l.5 7.2 27.2 28.1 
1958 15.5 4.7 24.6 34.8 
1960 13.9 5.9 26.6 25.1 
1962 20.5 15.1 30.0 31.3 
1964 18.3 15.5 3l.2 37.7 
1966 25.7 24.8 49.2 38.7 
1967 30.9 26.2 54.0 39.9 
Principal Imports 1960 1965 1967 
Milk 1.5 2.4 2.8 
Wheat flour 6.1 12.2 14.1 
Greases and edible oils 5.4 5.5 
Machinery 15.0 21.5 31.7 
Vehicles 5.7 16.0 2l.6 
Iron and steel 14.8 12.1 
Source: USAID (1969a). 
That Bolivia can efficiently and economically produce her own 
wheat, edible oil, milk and other foods is no longer seriously 
questioned. Why then does she not allocate the necessary 
investment funds to the task? For example, it is estimated that the 
Barrientos government annually allotted only 3 percent of its 
budget to agriculture. In addition, nearly all of these investment 
funds were received and spent by the corporate agriculture sector 
in the lowlands of Santa Cruz and the Beni. Consequently, the 
methods of production and level of technology in the highlands 
and valleys has remained virtually unchanged since the time of the 
Incas. Community development is the largest single project in the 
traditional rural sector and its major efforts are directed to 
improving health and education. It is therefore not surprising to 
find that the production of such traditional crops as potatoes, 
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corn and wheat remained stagnant or decreased from 1964 to 
1968.7 On the other hand, the increase in rice, sugar and beef was 
due to large public investments supporting private corporate 
activity in the lowlands. 
Table 6 Indices of Selected Agricultural Products* 
(1963 = 100) 
Peeled Refined Corn 
Year Rice Sugar Beef Potatoes (Grain) Wheat 
1964 1.25 1.36 1.04 100 100 104 
1965 1.32 1.25 1.31 105 92 64 
1966 1.38 1.18 1.51 107 93 75 
1967 1.37 1.39 1.49 102 86 49 
1968 1.81 1.58 1.63t 102t 84 82 
*Original data in thousands of metric tons with the exception of beef which is in heads 
of cattle slaughtered. 
t USAID estimates. 
Source: USAID (1969a). 
For example, over $100 million has been invested in roads, 
colonization and related projects in the lowlands. All of this has 
indirectly benefited the corporate farmers in these regions. More 
specifically, cattle production in the Beni has made rapid progress 
due to past loans from IDA, AID and the government of Bolivia. 
In 1968, the Agricultural Bank began negotiating a $ 23 milliop 
loan with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank to finance beef cattle production. More recently, the 
Cattlemen's Association of the Beni signed a contract with 
COMIBOL to supply the entire nationalized mines' beef require-
ments. Originally these past investments were intended to make 
Bolivia self-sufficient in beef. Later, however, the goal was 
changed to promote exportation. 
A similar situation existed in rice and sugar production. In 1967 
and 1968 alone rice farmers received over $1 million in economic 
assistance from USAID. These loans, too, were predominantly 
made to large commercial producers and millers like Grace, Ransa 
and others. The resultant industrial concentration reached the 
point where 3 percent of the rice farmers in three Santa Cruz 
provinces produced over 30 percent of the area output on farms 
averaging better than 100 hectares. Today, Bolivia is self-sufficient 
in rice and sugar and no one can deny that the increase in the 
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output of these products was the result of these large investments 
in agricultural machinery, sugar and rice mills, etc. 
Both foreign lenders and the Bolivian government constantly 
~ite the production record of these few products as examples of 
the tremendous strides being made in agriculture. Nowhere, 
however, does one encounter an admission that such impressive 
returns were accompanied by a large opportunity cost. What, for 
example, would the returns have been had these millions been 
invested in the traditional sector of Bolivian agriculture? Perhaps 
Bolivia would not now be spending approximately $14 million 
annually of her scarce foreign exchange on imported wheat and 
flour (an amount, incidentally, vastly greater than the total value 
of the entire Bolivian rice and sugar production). It is paradoxical 
that the local currency generated from PL480 wheat flour sales 
was used to build roads, promote colonization and increase 
production of rice, sugar and cattle in the lowlands-that is, do 
everything except increase the production of wheat (Burke, 1971). 
In short, the peasant agriculturalists were discriminated against in 
Bolivia during the 1960s and because of this the agricultural sector 
stagnated. 
The reluctance and/or inability of the Barrientos government to 
deal with the small, competitive, noncorporate producers was also 
evident in the retailing service and artisan sectors. In every case the 
result was the same: production stagnant, productivity low and 
technology backward because little or no investment funds were 
made available to these producers. 
Stabilization and Growth 
Nationally, a very conservative monetary and fiscal policy was 
adhered to by the Barrientos government. It is only fair to point 
out that AID, IMF and other organizations made fiscal and 
monetary restraint conditional to aid. The result of the Bolivian 
government's pursuit of stable prices was increased government 
budget deficits and an enormous foreign debt. 
The major instrument responsible for the restricted credit 
expansion and overall spending in the Bolivian economy from 
1964 to 1968 was the annual IMF-Bolivian standby agreements.s 
The purpose of these agreements was to improve the balance of 
payments by restricting credit expansion and spending in the 
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economy-thereby improving public finances while maintaining 
reasonable price stability and economic growth. Table 7 reveals 
the amount and extent of these agreed upon credit restrictions 
from 1965 to 1968. 
Table 7 Credit and Spending Limitations of Recent 
IMF-Bolivian Standby Agreements ($b. millions) 
Subject to Ceilings 
Overall monetary system 
Central government (GOB) 
Public corporations 
Counterpart accounts 
Private sector 
1965 
122 
116 
6 
1966 
161 
110 
40 
11 
1967 
109 
60 
3 
40 
6 
1968 
193.6 
125.6 
47.9 
59.4 
-39.3 
Note: These figures are only approximations since the standby agreements are not 
available to the general public. In addition, the time period of the agreements vary. The 
1968 agreements lasted, for example, thirteen and one-half months. 
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia, Departamento Monetario. 
By more or less adhering to these controls, apparent price 
stability was achieved. The Bolivian peso remained at 11,885 to 
the U.S. dollar, foreign exchange reserves increased from $21.3 
million in 1964 to $32.4 million in 1968,9 and inflation was at 
least contained as seen in Table 8 below. 
As indicated by the data, these nonselective monetary restraints 
were no panacea for Bolivia's economic problems. On the 
contrary, there is every reason to believe that the tight monetary 
policy, at least in part, contributed to these very same problems. 
The stable exchange rate, while it has its merits, was almost 
considered sacrosanct by the Bolivian authorities. However, 
because Bolivia's trading partners continually devalued their 
currencies over this time period, it follows that if the Bolivian peso 
was optimally related to the currencies of her trading partners in 
1959-with the exception of the United States and Germany-it is 
highly unlikely that the peso remains today in the same optimum 
relationship. 1 0 Not only did the stable fixed exchange rate do 
nothing to induce export earnings or retard import expenditures, 
it was also ineffective in stimulating foreign investments or 
reinvestment of foreign profits earned in Bolivia. Net private 
foreign investment decreased by $12.5 million (mainly Gulf Oil 
Company investments) in 1965 to an estimated minus $ 2.8 million 
in 1968.1 1 During the same time period, net investment income 
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Table 8 Balance of Payments, Central Government Total Budget, 
Increases in Foreign Debt, Rate of Inflation 
and Rate of Real Economic Growth (1964-1968) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
GOB budget* 
($b. millions) 
-95.0 -228.5 -224.8 -445.7 -477.2 
Increases in GOB 
foreign debt 
($ U.S. millions) 
Balance of payments* 
($ U.S. millions) 
Rate of inflation 
(La Paz) 
Rate of growth 
(GDP in constant prices) 
Per capita GSP in 
constant prices 
*Deficit (-); surplus (+) 
12.1 
17.6 
10.2 
4.8 
2.4 
t$9 million in interest to Eximbank forgiven. 
Source: USAID (1969a). 
14.2 
14.2 
2.9 
5.6 
3.4 
7.9t 22.0 37.6 
3.2 -9.0 0.6 
6.9 11.2 5.5 
6.5 7.2 4.7 
3.9 3.1 4.9 
leaving the country increased from $1 million to $10.5 million. 
U.S. grants to Bolivia also decreased from $18.4 million in 1964 to 
$3.5 million in 1968.12 The only thing which saved Bolivia from 
experiencing a complete disaster in her international accounts in 
1967 and 1968 was the compensating increase in foreign loans to 
the central government and her public corporations from $14.2 
million in 1964 to $52.0 million in 1968. 
Ultimately, these tremendous increases in central government 
capital expenditures to compensate for the decreased foreign 
investment expenditures and U.S. grants resulted in large budget 
deficits and tremendous increases in the nation's foreign debt.1 3 
Although private domestic investments increased during 
1964-68, these too were severely handicapped by the credit 
restrictions inasmuch as they were instrumental in exhausting the 
excess reserves of the private banking system. 1 4 
Fortunately, increased savings were forthcoming to finance 
much of the new domestic investment spending. Bank demand 
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deposits grew from $b. 142.4 million in 1964 to $b. 282.9 in 
1968, bank savings deposits from $b. 98.2 to $b. 264.8, and the 
portion of total loans to the private sector from 26 percent in 
1963 to 50 percent in 1968 (USAID, 1969a). 
In summary, the tight money policy of the Barrientos 
government can hardly be considered an unequivocal success. 
True, price stability was obtained which in turn encouraged an 
increase in domestic savings and investment during 1964-68. 
However, the tight credit restrictions prevented domestic invest-
ments (both private and public) from increasing in sufficient 
quantity to offset the decrease in U.S. grants and foreign 
investment. In addition, virtually the entire flow of investments 
from all sources was allocated to large public and private 
corporations or to social overhead capital projects like roads. 
Stable prices, while serving the Bolivian corporate interests in the 
short run, may well have been self-defeating inasmuch as the 
nation's budget remained unbalanced, the foreign debt increased 
and the people's aspirations for a higher standard of living were 
scarcely satisfied. 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Table 9 Reserves of the Private Banking System 
($b. millions) 
Total Legal 
Reserves Reserves 
60.5 48.4 
97.9 63.0 
104.6 84.2 
116.8 96.9 
120.6 122.0 
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos, Boletines Mensuales. 
Excess 
Reserves 
12.1 
24.9 
20.4 
19.9 
-1.4 
These last statements are thinly veiled implications that the 
Barrientos government sacrificed growth for price stability. There 
is no way of knowing what would have been the effect upon 
prices, output, etc., had the government seen fit to pursue some 
alternative policy. Although Bolivia's real growth rate over these 
years is rather impressive, especially when contrasted with those of 
previous years, one cannot but suspect that a much greater 
increase in real output could have been obtained at very little cost. 
For example, a greater expansion of credit would undoubtedly 
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have resulted in increased domestic private investment in light of 
the great demand for loanable funds. That such an expansion of 
domestic credit would inevitably contribute to inflation is 
doubtful. 15 Likewise, a policy of allocating a small amount of 
investment funds to the noncorporate sector of the economy in 
quick payoff projects such as flour import substitution (instead of 
high-cost, long-term payoff infrastructure projects) would have 
reaped very large and immediate benefits for the Bolivian 
economy. It is impossible to imagine Bolivia attaining anything 
approximating self-sustaining growth unless the traditional sector 
is integrated into the country's market economy. 
Nationalism 
There are various other ways in which national corporatism 
manifested itself throughout the years of the Barrientos admin-
istration. Institutions and activities which create, expand or 
strengthen nationalism prospered from 1964 to 1968. Foremost 
among these institutions was public education. Approximately 33 
percent of the central government's budget appropriations in 1968 
went to education; half of the school population received Food 
for Peace assistance; and a bewildering number of education and 
human resource stUdies have been made. 1 6 The World Bank, lOB, 
UNESCO, UNICEF and similar organizations had numerous 
projects in operation and expressed a willingness to invest even 
more in the area. 
All this is eminently logical since public education is an 
indispensable building block of nationalism. Education as a 
mechanism of national integration is a particularly crucial question 
in a racially diverse country such as Bolivia where over 60 percent 
of the population is both racially and culturally Indian. One could 
argue that the effort in public education, whatever its presumed 
benefit for the Indian masses, was also an attempt by the 
dominant mestizo and white groups to control the Indian majority 
by "integrating" them into the extant creole culture. Education is 
also a field considered to lie within the public domain by the 
United States and other western donors, which qualifies it for 
massive aid. These huge expenditures of funds and effort could 
not, however, raise the Bolivian literacy rate above an estimated 
60 percent of the population by 1968. This is more indicative of 
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the magnitude of the problem than the lack of commitment on 
the part of the government and others. Education is one of the 
few noncorporate institutions that can look forward to continued 
support from the national corporate establishment of Bolivia. 
Road construction was another activity vigorously promoted by 
the Barrientos government. The central government's highway 
expenditures, exclusive of foreign grants and loans, averaged 
approximately $ 5 million annually from 1964 to 1968. Roads, 
like education, are generally considered to lie within the public 
domain and received more foreign assistance than any other 
project. USAID alone invested over $75 million in roads since 
1961 and presently has approximately $ 68 million in the road 
construction pipeline.! 7 Typically, road construction is justified 
on the grounds that it promotes colonization and ultimately 
increases agricultural production. The poor performance of the 
entire agricultural sector, however, belies the elaborate and 
expensive cost-benefit studies which attempt to economically 
justify road projects. Roads are favored over other projects 
because of the attempt to integrate the culturally diverse and 
geographically dispersed segments of Bolivian society and thus 
serve the national corporate state. Again, the modest gains in this 
field, as measured by the 15,500 miles of roads in all of Bolivia, 
indicate no lack of commitment on the part of the national 
corporate governments. However, there exists abundant evidence 
of the unplanned, inefficient and unproductive nature of Bolivia's 
transportation development.! 8 
Finally, no respectable national corporate structure would be 
complete without a strong military. The Barrientos government 
increased its expenditures on military outlays from $ b. 71.7 
million in 1964 to $ b. 160.9 million in 1968, or by more than 100 
percent. This was the largest percentage increase in central 
government expenditures on current account over this time period 
(lMF, 1967-68). The obvious reason Bolivia maintains approx-
imately 20,000 men in the armed forces is to police the nation, 
i.e., "maintain law and order." The absence of armor, combat 
aircraft, etc., belies any claim to protecting national sovereignty. 
The multimillion dollar military assistance supplied by the United 
States is, in effect, counterrevolutionary political assistance. In 
AID jargon, part of this support is designated "public safety" 
assistance. Politics and the military in Bolivia are inextricably 
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intertwined, and therefore the military, like education and road 
construction, can look forward to continued support and close 
association with the national corporate state. 
From an economic point of view, these vast expenditures on 
education, roads and the military at this stage of Bolivia's 
development can hardly be justified. Aside from the military 
expenditures which need little explanation, the other two are 
high-cost, long-term investments in infrastructure of questionable 
payoff. They are major contributors to the current government 
budget deficits, balance of payments deficits and foreign debt. 
They appear to be classic examples of the type of misallocation of 
resources one encounters in this type of system. 
The Social Effects of the Policy 
Whatever the long-range economic merits of the Barrientos 
program, it was in the short run a period of prosperity for some. 
The healthy private sector gave birth to an incipient new upper 
class of entrepreneurs, speculators and high level managers. The 
urban middle class benefited from the expansion of middle-level 
public and private jobs, rising salaries and a stable currency. As the 
data above indicated, the single largest institution to benefit was 
the Bolivian military. Aside from the limited hard data available, 
the new prosperity of the middle and incipient upper classes was 
more than obvious in the proliferation of high rise apartments, 
posh restaurants, boutiques, fashionable clothing, night clubs, etc. 
(see date on construction boom in Table 4). 
The cost of this new prosperity was borne mainly by the 
popular masses, i.e., workers, urban marginals and peasants; the 
hardest hit were workers and in particular miners. Although labor 
supported the overthrow of Paz, it was soon to learn that the 
thrust against its position went deeper than the policy preference 
of a single individual. In the spring of 1965, the Barrientos 
government issued a series of labor decrees aimed at bringing the 
unions under control. In the mines there were massive layoffs, 
salaries were cut in half (from roughly $1.60 a day to $0.80 a day) 
and there were reductions in subsidized store privileges. 1 9 When 
the miners reacted (May 1965), the military invaded the mines, 
smashed the strike and disarmed the militias. When the remainder 
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of organized labor protested, the military moved against the entire 
movement killing or exiling leaders and submitted what was left of 
the once powerful unions to strict governmental control. In 
September 1965 and June 1967 the military again entered the 
mines by force and put the major mines under permanent 
occupation. With the possible exception of oil workers, Bolivian 
laborers experienced a relative decline in living standards during 
the Barrientos period, primarily because they were forced to live 
on fixed or reduced wages in an economy that was running an 
inflation of approximately 6 percent a year. Although some new 
jobs were created, especially in construction, they were more than 
offset by rural-urban migration which held down wages, reduced 
employment security and dramatically increased the urban 
marginal population of the unemployed and underemployed. 
From a political point of view the Indian peasantry, in terms of 
publicity at least, was the most courted group in the nation. 
Utilizing a helicopter, Barrientos traveled widely in the country-
side donning a poncho here, mounting a mule there, and 
embracing peasants everywhere. 
On each stop he demonstrated his largess by dedicating a 
school, promising potable water or distributing soccer balls and 
uniforms to the children. He became the patron of all the 
peasants-a personalized symbol of he from whom all good things 
would personally flow. Throughout the countryside, towns and 
villages vied for his personal attention by naming everything from 
the town hall to the local bridge after him. 
Whatever went into the countryside was localized and personal-
istic. The operative logic appeared to be that wherever the 
peasants were politically sophisticated and their leaders loyal, they 
gained; where they were politically marginal or their support in 
question, they were either ignored or punished. In certain regions 
the unions were squashed and old landowners and townsmen made 
a political comeback (Research Institute ... , 1969: 180-206). 
The apparent universal peasant support of Barrientos was in fact 
pockets of peasant support with rewards doled out accordingly. A 
good deal of the money spent in the countryside went to buy 
peasant leaders. As the data above indicated, the Indian peasantry 
as a whole gained little, and relative to other groups actually lost. 
Barrientos courted the peasants through the classic demagogic 
means of highly visible activity with large political payoffs but 
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with little substantial material benefit in terms of growth or 
increased living standards. 
To most outside observers, especially those hospitable to his 
policies, the Barrientos regime was considered a resounding success 
story. In this paper we have tried to show that from the points of 
view of long-range economic growth and social justice, that 
judgment is dubious. From the point of view of building viable 
civil and political institutions his tenure was also mixed. From the 
beginning, the regime suffered from two critical structural 
weaknesses: (1) it had no political organizational base; and (2) it 
excluded the major political organizations of the country. Aside 
from the few pockets of peasant support, Barrientos relied 
primarily on the military to keep him in power. 
As civilian opposition to his regime mounted in 1968-69 (led by 
the excluded parties, labor and students), Barrientos's standing 
with the military decreased sharply. Although a couple of 
attempted coups failed, the signs increasingly pointed to a military 
takeover. Before the drama could be played out, however, 
Barrientos was killed on April 27, 1969 when his helicopter 
crashed after a trip to a peasant village. 
After a brief and confused civil interregnum the military 
emerged again in September 1970 to assume open control of the 
government. From September 1970 to August 1971, Bolivia, first 
under General Alfredo Ovando and then General Jose Torres, 
appeared to move sharply away from national corporatism. In 
August 1971, however, the military backed by the MNR and its 
old enemy the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) threw Torres out 
and announced an end to his "leftist madness." Now marching in 
tandem the military and the MNR are putting Bolivia firmly back 
on the national corporate track. 
Conclusion 
The national corporatist style of political economy that emerged 
in Bolivia during the 1960s is a logical outcome of the national 
populist approach to problems of development. A number of 
factors operate to lead to this outcome. One is the clash between 
the imperatives of the elite's developmental aims (investment) and 
the demands of the supporters of the movement (consumption) in 
an environment of scarcity. This clash is exacerbated by the 
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multi class nature of the national populist movement and the 
inevitable conflict of interests among its supporters once such a 
movement achieves formal power. The result is the thorny 
problem of how to allocate rewards and more importantly, costs, 
within any developmental strategy. In confronting this problem 
two factors become crucial: the fundamental orientation of the 
national populist elite and the realities of the international 
situation. The orientation of these elites is fundamentally 
middle-class, elitist and reformist. This orientation becomes 
critical when the elite seeks to decide how to relate' to 
international actors. 
While populism is rhetorically nationalistic and antiimperialistic, 
the elites of these movements, in this case the MNR, have rejected 
the eastern socialist bloc as a major source of aid and therefore, in 
the long run, were forced to remain dependent on western 
capitalist powers for needed external financing. As we have seen, 
aid through instrumentalities such as the IMF, etc., carries strings 
which limit options on how to deal with social costs and therefore 
has profound political repercussions. Thus the middle-class 
orientation of the populist elite and the realities of external 
financing combine to create a reality wherein the situation of 
dependence is modified but by no means eliminated. The popUlist 
approach is heavily statist (thereby swelling the number of 
bureaucratic positions) but in no way socialist. Populism attacks 
the so-called feudal past and dependence in the name of a new 
form of dependence and a technocratic form of state capitalism 
which we call national corporatism. 
The concept of national corporatism is still crude and needs 
refinement. Our tentative view of how the ideal-typical national 
corporatist system operates is as follows. Control in the system is 
in the hands of a complex new elite of economic and political 
entrepreneurs, technocrats, bureaucrats and often top labor lead-
ers. In Bolivia, labor was excluded because: (a) the unions 
controlled important industries, e.g., mining, which had to be 
"reformed"; and (b) the unions were led by leaders who rejected 
the corporate model. In other countries, e.g., Mexico, highly 
organized unions led by "cooperative" leaders have often obtained 
"a piece of the action," thereby dividing the labor movement into 
favored and unfavored segments. The power of the new elites rests 
on an alliance of powerful corporate interests in the public and 
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private sectors coordinated by an agglomerated party or, as has 
recently been the case in Peru and Bolivia, by a nationalist 
oriented military. Through such coordination, the state or public 
sector seeks to "regulate" the private sector so that its activities 
redound to national economic growth. The distribution of jobs 
and income is accomplished through bargaining in a nationally 
regulated market with those highly organized groups capable of 
deploying political or economic power holding the upper hand. 
Hence, the bulk of the costs tends to fall on noncorporate 
interests such as peasants, urban marginals and the less well-
organized workers. These allocations are often backed by force in 
cases of protest-for example, the Bolivian army's occupation of 
the mines in 1965 and 1967. National corporatism as an economic 
philosophy differs from the more orthodox philosophies of social-
ism or capitalism. National corporatism as the name implies, favors 
nationally owned enterprises and is at least rhetorically anti-
imperialistic. While national corporate governments are willing to 
nationalize foreign holdings, such actions are not based on a 
philosophy that favors public over private property. These nation-
alizations are always presented as specific actions against specific 
companies for their specific antinational sins. While some foreign 
holdings are taken over and often certain sectors put off limits to 
outsiders, foreign investment as such is not rejected but in fact 
encouraged. National corporate governments attempt to control 
such investment and seek better terms for the country, but often 
their abi!ity to bargain IS cons~r~in~d by international ~conomi.G. 
realities. 
With respect to productive property, national corporatism is 
indifferent as to public or private domestic ownership. However, 
because few governmental officials themselves are indifferent to 
the issue of public versus private ownership, they tend, at any 
given time, to favor one or the other. The long-run result of this 
continual oscillation is compromise, i.e., a mixed economy. Lastly, 
national corporatism promotes corporations over other forms of 
business enterprise. Autonomous corporations, both public and 
private, are viewed as dynamic, efficient, modern institutions 
which will ensure the economic development of the nation and a 
higher standard of living for its people. Small peasant farms, 
cooperatives, artisans, and other non corporate producers are tol-
erated, but never enthusiastically supported. 
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It is our hope that this exploration in the development of 
national corporatism in Bolivia will aid in the understanding of the 
changes taking place in other Latin American nations, particularly 
those where national popular movements have achieved some 
measure of power. Moreover, we hope it gives a base for 
anticipating the emergence of general lines of political economy in 
other nations which choose the national popular approach. 
Specifically we have in mind Peru which is presently engaged in an 
experiment in military populism. Our anticipation is that when all 
is said and done military populism in Peru will result in a system 
that is a variation on the theme of national corporatism. 
NOTES 
L The following statement of the MNR leader Victor paz Estenssoro (1955: 316-17) is 
a good example: "It is a general law that the men of the oppressed class are never the 
ones who achieve gains for their own class, and this for a simple reason: those of the 
oppressed class do not have the economic means to even raise themselves culturally and 
develop their personality, let alone be able to make a great reform or a revolution ... " 
2. The Plan involved a pledge of $37 million to refurbish COMIBOL by the U.S. 
government, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-American Development 
Bank. In return Bolivia was to "rationalize" its labor policies primarily by submitting 
unions to managerial discipline, holding the line on wages and laying off excess workers. 
The plan was to cause a major confrontation between the MNR and labor. 
3. U.S. military aid to Bolivia was resumed in 1958 and climbed from $0.1 million in 
1958 to $3.2 million in 1964. During this period the military regained its traditional 
control function and assumed important developmental tasks as well. As relations 
between the MNR and labor deteriorated the military moved into the pivot of the 
political situation. For data on military and economic aid see Blasier (1971: 77). 
4. For a more detailed analysis of the 1952-64 period see Malloy (1970) and Malloy 
and Thorn (1971). 
5. These include Supreme Decrees Nos. 7148, 7447 and 7360 of 1965. 
6. A Bolivian highland latifundium was a large agricultural operation which utilized 
great quantities of land and labor combined with little capital other than breeding 
livestock. They were usually absentee-owned and run on traditional rather than 
profit-maximizing principles. 
7. Many observers become confused when they consider the multitUde of projects in 
the traditional sector of Bolivian agriculture with their meager results. But the Peace 
Corps, community development and the like are no substitutes for massive investments 
in production. 
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8. These standby agreements are arrangements between the IMF and individual 
countries whereby the Fund furnishes the country with international reserves (gold, 
dollars, etc.) in excess of its "drawing rights" provided it undertakes certain corrective 
measures to balance its international accounts. A country has drawing rights to 25 
percent of its IMF quota; Bolivia's IMF quota is $25 million; therefore, she has drawing 
rights to $7.25 million. Bolivia has entered into eleven standby agreements with the 
Fund, the last one for $20 million became effective January 16,1969, which will run for 
approximately one year. 
9. However, $12.4 million of these 1968 total reserves were IMF reserves as opposed to 
$5.5 million of the 1965 total reserves (USAID, 1969b). 
10. Only the U.S. dollar remained in a fixed relationship with the Bolivian peso. Great 
Britain devalued her currency by 15 percent since 1964. Argentina by 167 percent, 
Brazil by 213 percent, Chile by 129 percent and Peru by 60 percent. 
11. The minus figure is explained by depreciation charges exceeding investment 
expenditures. 
12. The decrease in grants was a unilateral decision on the part of the United States. 
Bolivia could only accept it. 
13. U.S. grants to the central government decreased from $b. 93.5 million in 1964 to 
$b. 10.6 million in 1968, while central government capital expenditures increased from 
$b. 160.5 million in 1964 to $b. 473.9 million in 1968. The central government's total 
budget deficit in 1964 was $b. 95 million and in 1968 it was an estimated $b. 477.2 
million (IMF, 1967-68). 
14. This unusual situation of the existence of temporary negative excess reserves was the 
result of SD No. 08576 of November 16, 1968, which raised the legal reserve 
requirement on demand deposits from 35 percent to 40 percent and on savings deposits 
from 25 percent to 30 percent. Shortly thereafter, however, the banks were able to 
adjust. 
15. The only statistics on inflation in the La Paz price index (in addition to being 
somewhat unreliable) only represent about 10 percent of the Bolivian population and 
not a representative 10 percent at that. Further, these credit restrictions themselves have 
contributed to higher interest charges and higher procurement prices for the government, 
which because of the central bank credit ceiling imposed upon it by the IMF Bolivian 
standby agreements was forced to buy with nonnegotiable IOUs at higher prices. 
16. To name just a few, there is the Ohio State University Resource Survey, a School 
Building Survey and a Vocational Education Survey all financed by USAID/La Paz. 
17. The fact that virtually all road construction was undertaken by U.S. contractors 
undoubtedly made it a politically acceptable AID venture. 
18. The UN/IBRD Global Transportation Study exposes a greater deal of the 
unplanned, inefficient and politically oriented Bolivian road program. This perhaps 
explains why the Bolivian government has not yet seen fit to release the study to the 
general public. 
19. The labor force in COMIBOL mines was decreased from 25,225 workers in 1964 to 
20,917 in 1968. 
POPULISM TO CORPORATISM: BOLIVIA 73 
REFERENCES 
BLASIER, COLE 
1971 "The United States and the Revolution." In Malloy and Thorn (eds.), 
Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
BURKE, MELVIN 
1970 "El sector privado en la economia boliviana y la necesidad de credito." 
Estudios Andinos 1: 117. 
1971 "Does Food for Peace Assistance Damage the Bolivian Economy? " 
Inter-American Economic Affairs 25: 3-26. 
COTLER, JULIO 
1970-71 "Political Crisis and Military Populism in Peru." Studies in Comparative 
International Development 6 (no.5): 95-113. 
DITELLA,TORCUATO 
1965 "Populism and Reform in Latin America." In Claudio Veliz (ed.), 
Obstacles to Change in Latin America. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
EDER,GEORGE 
IMF 
1968 Inflation and Development in Latin America: A Case History of 
Inflation and Stabilization in Bolivia. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
1967-68 Staff Reports 1967-1968. 
MALLOY, JAMES 
1970 Bolivia the Uncompleted Revolution. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pi ttsburgh Press. 
MALLOY, JAMES and RICHARD THORN 
1971 Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Ministerio de Planificacion 
1962 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Economico y Social 1962-1971. La Paz 
(Bolivia). 
1969 Cuentas Nacionales de Bolivia 1950-1969. 
PAZ ESTENSSORO, VICTOR 
1955 Discursos parlamentarios. La Paz (Bolivia). 
Research Institute for the Study of Man 
1969 Changing Rural Bolivia. New York. 
THORN, RICHARD 
USAID 
1971 "The Economic Transformation." In Malloy and Thorn (eds.). Beyond 
the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press. 
1969a Bolivia, Estadisticas Economicas. La Paz (Bolivia). 
1969b Monetary and Exchange Developments. La Paz (Bolivia), mimeo. 
Copyright © 2002 EBSCO Publishing 
Copyright of Studies in Comparative International Development is the property of Springer Science & Business
Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
